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Team Reasoning, Framing and Cooperation
! Cooperation is puzzling for orthodox game theory because, although cooperation is arguably 
rational and a substantial number of people cooperate in real life,  game theory cannot explain why  
cooperation is rational nor predict that rational players will cooperate in one-shot games. Solving 
these puzzles of cooperation is one of the motivations behind the development of a body of 
decision-theoretic literature on team agency.1 This seeks to extend standard game theory, where 
each individual asks separately ʻWhat should I do?ʼ, to allow teams of individuals to count as 
agents and for players to ask the question ʻWhat should we do?ʼ. This leads to team reasoning, a 
distinctive mode of reasoning that is used by members of teams, and which may result in 
cooperative actions. The basic idea is that, when an individual reasons as a member of a team, 
she considers which combination of actions by members of the team would best promote the 
teamʼs objective, and then performs her part of that combination. The rationality of each 
individualʼs action derives from the rationality of the joint action of the team.
! One can distinguish between the generic idea of team reasoning and specific versions 
proposed by different people. The most fully developed theories of team reasoning are those of 
Michael Bacharach (1999; 2006) and Robert Sugden (1993; 2003). They differ in important ways 
regarding: what happens when there is not common knowledge of group membership, what the 
group agent should take as its goals and how group agency comes about. In this chapter, I will 
explore some of the ramifications of each of these differences.
! After showing how a basic version of team reasoning with common knowledge solves 
problems of cooperation (sections 1 and 2), by comparing what Bacharach and Sugden advocate 
that players should do in the prisonerʼs dilemma when there is not common knowledge of group 
identification, I will clarify the concept of a group goal in each of their theories (section 3). By 
comparing how group agency comes about, and the role of framing in each of Bacharach and 
Sugdenʼs theories, I will offer some insights into framing in decision-making in general (section 4). 
Finally, I compare team reasoning with payoff-transformation theories of cooperation (section 5).
! One can draw an analogy between rational choice theory and natural selection. Whilst the 
rational agent of decision theory maximise utility, evolutionary processes maximise fitness. There is 
also an analogy between team reasoning and group selection: in team reasoning, the team (or the 
team utility function) is an additional primitive to those found in standard decision theory, whilst 
theories of group selection add groups to the ontology of evolutionary biology. At points throughout 
the paper I will draw the analogy. However, note that it is only a structural analogy, suggesting a 
common mathematical framework, and, as I show in section 5, the truth or falsity of group selection 
has no bearing on the truth or falsity of team reasoning and vice versa.
1
1 See Hodgson (1967), Regan (1980) Gilbert (1987), Hurley (1989), Sugden (1993; 2003), Hollis 
(1998), Bacharach (1999; 2006), and Anderson (2001). 
1. The Puzzle of Cooperation: Stag Hunts and Prisonerʼs Dilemmas
Common models of cooperation are examples of what Michael Bacharach (2006) called 
games with scope for common gain, or games with scope for short. In games with scope, there 
exists a Nash equilibrium whose outcome could be improved upon for both players if at least one 
of them plays a different strategy. (Kollock (1998a) gives this as the definition of a social dilemma.) 
Games with scope offer the possibility of mutual benefit and, hence, we may think of them as 
offering the possibility of cooperation. Two games that are closely identified with the problem of 
cooperation are the prisonerʼs dilemma and the stag hunt.2
The prisonerʼs dilemma, whose generic form is illustrated in figure 1, has been the locus 
classicus in the study of cooperation (e.g. Taylor (1987)).  In specifying the payoffs of this game, 
we require only that they are symmetrical between the players and that they satisfy two 
inequalities.  The inequality a > b > c > d encapsulates the central features of the Prisonerʼs 
Dilemma: for each player, the best outcome is that in which he chooses defect and his opponent 
chooses cooperate; the outcome in which both choose cooperate is ranked second; the outcome 
in which both choose defect is ranked third; and the outcome in which he chooses cooperate and 
his opponent chooses defect is the worst of all.  The inequality b > (a + d)/2 stipulates that each 
player prefers a situation in which both players choose cooperate to one in which one player 
chooses cooperate and the other chooses defect, each player being equally likely to be the free-
rider.  This condition is usually treated as a defining feature of the Prisonerʼs Dilemma.
! ! ! ! ! ! Player 2
! ! ! ! ! cooperate! defect
! Player 1! cooperate! b, b! ! d, a
! ! ! defect! ! a, d! ! c, c    
a > b > c > d
b > (a + d)/2
Figure 1: The Prisonerʼs Dilemma
For each player, defect strictly dominates cooperate.  Each individual player can reason to 
the conclusion, ʻThe action that gives the best result for me is defectʼ. Thus, in its explanatory form, 
conventional game theory predicts that both players will choose defect.  In its normative form, it 
recommends defect to both players.  Yet both would be better off if each chose cooperate instead 
2
2 Games with scope also include co-ordination games where the equilibria have different payoffs. 
One example is the game of Hi-Lo, which has also attracted attention in the team reasoning 
literature, e.g. Sugden (1993), Bacharach (2006), Gold and Sugden (2007), Bardsley (2007), Gold 
and Sugden (2008).
of defect. Thus, each player can also reason to the conclusion: ʻThe pair of actions that gives the 
best result for us is not (defect, defect)ʼ.3  
! The game theoretic puzzle of cooperation is isomorphic to the biological problem of its 
evolution, often referred to by biologists as the problem of the evolution of altruism, with the 
payoffs now being units of fitness (often taken to be number of offspring). Natural selection favours 
individuals with a relatively high fitness compared to the rest of the population. Biological altruism, 
by definition, involves advantaging others at a cost to self. So the altruist is at an evolutionary 
disadvantage compared to non-altruists and altruism should never evolve.  
! Arguably, many situations which have been analysed as prisonerʼs dilemmas can be better 
thought of as stag hunts.4 Brian Skyrms (2004) considers the stag hunt, rather than the prisonerʼs 
dilemma, to be the paradigm problem of cooperation. The stag hunt is is named for Rousseauʼs 
story about the beginnings of human society and the dilemma faced by hunters in the state of 
nature, as they begin to learn the benefits of cooperation. The generic payoff matrix for a stag hunt 
is given in figure 2. For the story, consider two hunters who can each chase either stag or rabbit. 
Between the two of them, they could catch a stag which provides a large amount of meat, but if 
one of them chases stag alone then he will fail and go hungry. Rabbits can be caught by one 
person but provide less than half the meat of a stag. What each hunter cares about is how much 
meat he gets, so each prefers the outcome where both hunt stag to hunting rabbit (together or 
alone). In turn, hunting rabbit is preferred to hunting stag alone. 
The game has two Nash equilibria, the outcome where both hunt stag and the outcome 
where both hunt rabbit. In other words, if player 2 hunts stag then player 1 does best if she also 
hunts stag and if player 2 hunts rabbit then player 1 does best if she hunts rabbit, and vice versa.
! ! ! ! ! P2
! ! ! ! stag! ! rabbit
! P1! stag! ! s, s! ! q, r
! ! rabbit! ! r, q! ! r, r    
s > r > q 
Figure 2: A stag hunt
We might think of hunting stag as cooperating. Unlike the prisonerʼs dilemma, if one player 
cooperates then the other player is best off cooperating too. Both cooperating is an equilibrium. 
3
3 In order to conclude that (cooperate, cooperate) is the best pair of strategies for them, the players 
have to judge the payoff combinations (a, d) and (d, a) to be worse ʻfor themʼ than (b, b).
4 See Joshi et al (2005)  for an illustration from everyday life, Kollock (1998b) for an example from 
the lab, and Kollock (1998a) and Skyrms (2004) for theoretical arguments.
Further, hunting stag is better for both players than hunting rabbit so it may seem obvious that the 
players should coordinate on the equilibrium that they prefer.
However from the assumptions that the players are perfectly rational (in the normal decision 
theoretic sense of maximising expected payoff) and that they have common knowledge of their 
rationality, we cannot deduce that each will choose stag. Or, expressing the same idea in 
normative terms, there is no sequence of steps of valid reasoning by which perfectly rational 
players can arrive at the conclusion that they ought to choose stag.  This is because, from the 
assumption of rationality, all we can infer is that each player chooses the strategy that maximises 
her expected payoff, given her beliefs about what the other player will do. All we can say in favour 
of stag is that, if either player expects the other to choose stag, then it is rational for the first player 
to choose stag too; thus, a shared expectation of stag-choosing is self-fulfilling among rational 
players. But exactly the same can be said about rabbit. And, in a one-shot game with common 
knowledge of rationality, there is no prior reason to expect the play of either stag or rabbit.5 
This is an example of the problem of equilibrium selection. Classical game theory cannot 
make a unique prediction of play unless it is supplemented with new criteria to select between the 
equilibria. So even if the outcome where both play the cooperative strategy is a Nash equilibrium, 
orthodox game theory cannot predict its play - and sometimes it is not an equilibrium, as in the 
prisonerʼs dilemma. Analogously, although normative game theory assumes that if there is a 
rational way to play the game, then it will be a Nash equilibrium (Nash, 1953), where there is more 
than one Nash equilibrium standard game theory has no way to advocate one over the other 
without introducing new assumptions - and, by this criteria, playing a strategy that is not a part of a 
Nash equilibrium is never rational.
2. Team Reasoning and Cooperation
The prisonerʼs dilemma and the stag hunt are both games with scope. In the Prisonerʼs 
Dilemma, the Nash equilibrium is (defect, defect) but each player does better if the outcome is 
(cooperate, cooperate). In the Stag Hunt, (rabbit, rabbit) is a Nash equilibrium but the players do 
better under (stag, stag). The Prisonerʼs Dilemma seems more intractable because (cooperate, 
cooperate) is not a Nash equilibrium, but standard game theory has nothing to say about when or 
why hunters chase stag instead of rabbit without adding further equilibrium selection criteria. The 
equilibrium selection problem is particularly perplexing in the stag hunt. Intuitively, it may seem 
4
5 The stag hunt is sometimes called an ʻassuranceʼ game, as each player would play stag if 
assured that the other player were going to play stag too. It is rational for a player to play stag if 
she believes that the probability that the other player will play stag is greater than (r - q) / (s - q), 
but the rational players of standard game theory have no reason to believe that.
obvious that each player should choose stag because both prefer the outcome of (stag, stag) to 
that of (rabbit, rabbit); but that ʻbecauseʼ has no standing in the formal theory.6
The source of both puzzles seems to be located in the mode of reasoning by which, in the 
standard theory, individuals move from preferences to decisions.  In the syntax of game theory, 
each individual must ask separately ʻWhat should I do?ʼ  In stag hunt, the game-theoretic answer 
to this question is indeterminate.  In the prisonerʼs dilemma, the answer is that defect should be 
chosen. Intuitively, however, it seems possible for the players to ask a different question: ʻWhat 
should we do?ʼ  In stag hunt, the answer to this question is surely: ʻChoose (stag, stag)ʼ.  In the 
Prisonerʼs Dilemma, ʻChoose (cooperate, cooperate)ʼ seems to be at least credible as an answer.  
! The reasoning that occurs in game theory is instrumental practical reasoning, where 
conclusions about what an agent ought to do are inferred from premises that include propositions 
about what the agent is seeking to achieve.  Such reasoning is instrumental in that it takes the 
standard of success as given; its conclusions are propositions about what the agent should do in 
order to be as successful as possible according to that standard.7 So instrumental practical 
reasoning presupposes a unit of agency that pursues its own objectives. Standard game theory 
presumes that the unit of agency is the individual. Theories of team agency generalize game 
theory to allow that teams can be agents.8 
! The basic idea is that, when an individual reasons as a member of a team, she considers 
which combination of actions by members of the team would best promote the teamʼs objective, 
and then performs her part of that combination. The rationality of each individualʼs action derives 
from the rationality of the joint action of the team. Gold and Sugden show that, in a group of 
agents, if there is common knowledge that each member group identifies, common knowledge that 
each member aims to maximise the team payoff function and a unique profile of actions that does 
this, then each individual can reach the conclusion that she should choose her component of that 
profile  (Gold and Sugden 2007; 2008).
This can lead to cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma and the stag hunt. First consider the 
prisonerʼs dilemma. We need to define a payoff function for the group consisting of Player 1 and 
Player 2.  We shall assume that, when a player identifies with a group, she wants to promote the 
combined interests of its two members, at least in so far as those interests are affected by the 
5
6 However there is a counter-argument which suggests that rational hunters chase rabbit, 
formalized in Harsanyi and Seltenʼs criteria of risk dominance (Harsanyi & Selten, 1988). Intuitively, 
hunting rabbit means a player will never get the big prize but it also ensures that she will never go 
hungry.
7 Bacharach, in his unpublished Scientific Synopsis describing his initial plans for Beyond 
Individual Choice, defines a mode of reasoning as valid in games if it is success-promoting: given 
any game of some very broad class, it yields only choices which tend to produce success, as 
measured by game payoffs.
8 Individual reasoning is a special case of team reasoning, where the team has only one member. 
See the analysis in Gold and Sugden (2007; 2008).
game that is being played.  If we assume that the payoff function treats the players symmetrically, 
we need to specify only three values of this function: the payoff when both players choose 
cooperate, which we denote uC, the payoff when both choose defect, which we denote uD, and the 
payoff when one chooses cooperate and one chooses defect, which we denote uF (for ʻfree ridingʼ). 
It seems unexceptionable to assume that the team payoff function is increasing in individual 
payoffs, which implies uC > uD.  Given the condition b > (a + d)/2, it is natural also to assume uC > 
uF.  Then the profile of actions by Player 1 and Player 2 that uniquely maximises the team payoff is 
(cooperate, cooperate).  If there is common knowledge of the rules of the game, each player can 
use team reasoning to reach the conclusion that she should choose cooperate (Gold and Sugden, 
2008).
Now consider the stag hunt.  Again we need to specify only three values of this function: the 
payoff when both players choose stag, which I denote uS; the payoff when both choose rabbit, 
which I denote uR; and the payoff when one chooses stag and the other chooses rabbit, which I 
denote uSR. It seems unexceptionable to assume that U is increasing in individual payoffs, which 
implies uS >  uR >  uSR. Then (stag, stag) is the profile that uniquely maximises the payoff function, 
and so (provided there is common knowledge of the rules of the game), each player can use team 
reasoning to reach the conclusion that she should choose stag.
! Thus team reasoning can predict the play of the the payoff dominant equilibrium. Payoff 
dominance is often used as a criterion for equilibrium selection (e.g. Harsanyi & Selten, 1988).  It is 
intuitively compelling but, previously, it has not been justified by standard game theoretic rationality  
assumptions. Rather it is an additional supposition, included purely for the purposes of equilibrium 
selection. In contrast, team reasoning can explain why rational agents play the strategies that lead 
to the payoff dominant equilibrium (given a reasonable assumption about the team payoff function, 
discussed further below).
! The idea that cooperating is better for the group also plays a fundamental role in the answer 
provided by theories of ʻgroupʼ or multi-level selection to the evolutionary puzzle of altruism. These 
theories allow that natural selection can act on groups as well as individuals. Although altruism 
puts the individual altruist at an evolutionary disadvantage, it can be advantageous at the level of 
the group, putting the group  at an advantage compared to groups composed of non-altruists. 
Depending on the relative strength of inter-individual and inter-group evolutionary pressures, 
altruism may evolve because it is good for the group (Sober & Wilson, 1998).
3. Team Agency, Group Goals and Expected Utility Theory
A minimal constraint on being an agent, for the purposes of instrumental practical reasoning, 
is that the (group) agent has an objective, which can be the basis of instrumental reasoning for its 
6
members. So theories of team reasoning need to assume that there is a group objective.9 The 
basic idea of team reasoning places no constraints on this objective but, in order to operationalize 
the theory, it is necessary to make some assumptions about the groupʼs goals. For example, in the 
discussion of cooperation above, I assumed that the collective utility function was increasing in 
individual payoffs, that it was symmetrical and, in the case of the prisonerʼs dilemma, made an 
assumption about how it would rank outcomes with different distributions of individual utility. 
A key issue is the relation between the individual agentsʼ utility and the groupʼs utility. 
Theories of team agency differ in the constraints they impose on this relationship. In this section, I 
compare what Bacharach and Sugdenʼs theories advocate that players should do in the prisonerʼs 
dilemma when there is not common knowledge of group identification. I then use the comparison 
to correct two misconceptions about what the theory of team reasoning is committed to, as regards 
expected utility maximization and the group goal. 
Team reasoning without common knowledge of group membership
Bacharachʼs theory of ʻcircumspect team reasoningʼ was formulated to explain cooperation in 
situations where there is not common knowledge of group identification. For Bacharach, whether a 
particular player identifies with a particular group is a matter of ʻframingʼ.  A frame is the set of 
concepts a player uses when thinking about her situation.  In order to  team reason, a player must 
have the concept ʻweʼ in her frame.  Bacharach proposes that the ʻweʼ frame is normally induced or 
primed by games that have the property of strong interdependence.  Roughly, a game has this 
property if it has a Nash equilibrium which is Pareto-dominated by the outcome of some feasible 
strategy profile.  So both the prisonerʼs dilemma and the stag hunt have the property of strong 
independence. (In the stag hunt, (rabbit, rabbit) is dominated by (stag, stag) - itself a Nash 
Equilibrium. In the prisonerʼs dilemma, (defect, defect) is Pareto-dominated by (cooperate, 
cooperate).
Although Bacharach proposes that the perception of strong independence increases the 
probability of group identification, he does not claim that games with this property invariably prime 
the ʻweʼ frame.  More specifically:
ʻIn a Prisonerʼs Dilemma, players might see only, or most powerfully, the feature of 
common interest and reciprocal dependence which lie in the payoffs on the main 
diagonal.  But they might see the problem in other ways.  For example, someone 
might be struck by the thought that her coplayer is in a position to double-cross her 
7
9 Extant theories also assume that the groupʼs objective is common knowledge amongst team 
reasoners, but that assumption could be relaxed.
by playing [defect] in the expectation that she will play [cooperate].  This perceived 
feature might inhibit group identification.ʼ (Bacharach, 2006, p.86)10
The implication is that the ʻweʼ frame might be primed but, alternatively, a player may see 
the game as one to be played by two separate individual agents. 
In Bacharachʼs theoretical framework, this dualism is best represented in terms of 
circumspect team reasoning.  Suppose there is a random process which, independently for each 
member of the group, determines whether or not that individual identifies with the group. Let ω 
(where 0 < ω ≤ 1) be the probability that, for any individual player, the ʻweʼ frame comes to mind; if 
it does, the player identifies with the group. Then an individual who group-identifies will maximize 
the expected value of the group payoff function given the probabilities that other group members 
fail to identify. (Any individual who identifies is assumed to also know the value of  ω. The idea is 
that, in coming to frame the situation as a problem ʻfor usʼ, an individual also gains some sense of 
how likely it is that another individual would frame it in the same way; in this way, the value of ω 
becomes common knowledge among those who use this frame.)
We can apply this to the prisonerʼs dilemma played by the group of Player 1 and Player 2. 
Define the group payoff function as before. If the ʻweʼ frame comes to mind, with probability ω, the 
player identifies with the group.  Assume that, if this frame does not come to mind, the player 
conceives of herself as a unit of agency and thus, using best-reply reasoning, chooses the 
dominant strategy defect.  We can now ask which protocol maximises the group payoff function, 
given the value of ω.  Viewed from within the ʻweʼ frame, the protocol (defect, defect) gives a payoff 
of uD with certainty.  Each of the protocols (cooperate, defect) and (defect, cooperate) gives an 
expected payoff of  ωuF + (1 – ω)uD.  The protocol (cooperate, cooperate) gives an expected 
payoff of  ω2 uC + 2ω(1 – ω)uF + (1 – ω)2uD.  There are two possible cases to consider.  If uF ≥ uD, 
then (cooperate, cooperate) is the team utility-maximising protocol for all possible values of ω.  
Alternatively, if uD > uF, which protocol maximises the team utility function depends on the value of 
ω.  At high values of ω, (cooperate, cooperate) is uniquely optimal; at low values, the uniquely 
optimal protocol is (defect, defect).11
If we assume either that uF ≥ uD or that the value of ω is high enough to make (cooperate, 
cooperate) the uniquely optimal protocol, we have a model in which players of the Prisonerʼs 
8
10 For Bacharach these features compete to be noticed and it is their relative salience that 
determines whether or not an agent will group identify. Another natural reading has the agent 
deliberating about whether or not to use the we-frame. As explained below, reasoning about 
frames has no place in Bacharachʼs framework. But Smerilli (2008) takes this ʻdouble-crossing 
intuitionʼ and proposes an extension to the theory, where agents adjudicate between the outcomes 
of individual and team reasoning, based on reasoning about deviation from equilibrium.
11 We can normalise the payoff function by setting uC = 1 and uD = 0.  Then, given that uF < 0, the 
critical value of ω is ω* = 2uF/(2uF – 1).  The protocol (cooperate, cooperate) is optimal if and only  if 
ω ≥ ω*, (defect, defect) is optimal if and only if ω  ≤ ω*.  There is no non-zero value of ω  at which 
(cooperate, defect) or (defect, cooperate) is optimal.
Dilemma choose cooperate if the ʻweʼ frame comes to mind, and defect otherwise.  Bacharach 
offers this result as an explanation of the observation that, in one-shot Prisonerʼs Dilemmas played 
under experimental conditions, each of cooperate and defect is usually chosen by a substantial 
proportion of players.  He also sees it as consistent with the fact that there are many people who 
think it completely obvious that cooperate is the only rational choice, while there are also many 
who feel the same about defect.  
If ω = 1 then there is common knowledge of group identification amongst group members, if 
ω < 1 then there is not. Since Bacharachʼs team reasoners act based on their ex ante probability 
that other members will group identify, if ω is less than 1 but high enough to make (cooperate, 
cooperate) the uniquely optimal protocol, a team reasoner may find ex poste that she has 
cooperated when the other player has defected. In other words, she may find that she has been 
ʻsuckeredʼ - as sometimes happens in the experiments whose results Bacharach sought to explain. 
This can happen because Bacharachʼs team reasoners cooperate without assurance that other 
group members are also team reasoning.12
Further, if uF ≥ uD , then the team reasoner will cooperate regardless of whether she expects 
the other player to group identify, regarding it as better to be suckered by the other player than to 
defect. For Bacharach, the way the group utility function ranks the off-diagonal payoffs is an open 
question.  In a very brief discussion of the group objective, Bacharach claims that it is likely to be 
Paretian and to embody principles of fairness (Bacharach, 2006, p.88). However these are not 
specified as conceptual constraints, but as testable hypotheses. Bacharach thought that group 
identification could explain why members of nationalistic movements are ready to sacrifice their 
lives for the cause (Bacharach 2006, footnotes, p.91), so he allowed in principle that the group 
objective might be welfare-decreasing for some members. 
Sugden disagrees with Bacharach on both these points. For Sugden, the purpose of the 
theory of team reasoning is to explain how people cooperate for mutual advantage, so he takes 
exception to the idea that the team utility function might make some individuals worse off by their 
individual lights (for example, ranking uF above uD), and to the possibility that a team reasoner 
might cooperate without assurance that other group members will act likewise. For Sugden, a 
person should not be made worse off by team reasoning. Hence he would place more constraints 
on the group objective than Bacharach. In Sugdenʼs theory the team should pursue outcomes that 
are advantageous to all its members. 
9
12 Bacharach also countenances a version of team reasoning that he calls restricted team 
reasoning, where the team reasoners know in advance that some of the team members will not 
team reason, and optimise the team utility function as best they can given that some team 
members will not function. But he prefers circumspect team reasoning because it is more general; 
we often donʼt know for certain whether or not other team members will group identify, or what 
those who do not group identify will do.
It also follows that Sugdenʼs team reasoners will not risk being suckered. On Sugdenʼs 
account of mutually assured team reasoning, a person will not commit herself to team reasoning 
unless she has assurance that other team members will also act on team reasoning. Sugden uses 
a theoretical framework in which the central concept is reason to believe. To say that a person has 
reason to believe a proposition p is to say that p can be inferred from propositions that she accepts 
as true, using rules of inference that she accepts as valid. In mutually assured team reasoning, 
team members will not act on the results of team reasoning unless each has reason to believe of 
all the others that (1) they identify with the group and acknowledge the group payoff function as the 
objective of the group, and (2) they endorse and act on mutually assured team reasoning. So if 
Sugdenʼs group members are not sure that they will all cooperate to achieve what they all take to 
be best for the group, then they will not team reason.
Team reasoning and expected utility theory
Some philosophers are uneasy about the association between team reasoning and expected 
utility theory. For instance, Raimo Tuomela (2009, p. 298), has complained of Gold and Sugden 
that ʻthe only collective goal that they consider and seem to take to be possible in their account is 
maximization of collective utilityʼ. Hence Tuomela claims that team reasoning is not applicable to all 
cooperative contexts because its conception of a goal is not applicable. It is quite difficult to work 
out what Tuomelaʼs complaint is, since there is a trivial sense in which virtually any reasoning can 
be represented as the maximization of a function so, when it occurs, team reasoning must involve 
maximization of a team objective function.13 But his remarks reflect a tendency of some 
philosophers to wonder whether expected utility theory is the right framework to apply in all 
occurrences of team agency. 
In response to that worry I note that, although Bacharachʼs theory of team reasoning 
explicitly incorporates expected utility theory, team reasoning per se is not committed to the idea of 
expected utility maximization. Whilst Bacharachʼs team reasoners maximise a group objective 
given that some members do not group identify, Sugdenʼs cooperate in a mutually advantageous 
enterprise. Hence Bacharachʼs theory implies that group members act to get the best outcome for 
the group even when other members fall short, whereas in Sugdenʼs they only team reason when 
they are sure that their cooperative actions will be reciprocated. So, in the presence of uncertainty, 
Sugdenʼs version of team reasoning does not involve maximization of expected utility. 
Team reasoning and averaging
10
13 In making his inference Tuomela also implies that the conscious goal of the agents is to 
ʻmaximize utilityʼ. But that would be a mistake because modeling a situation using game theory 
does not imply that agents have the conscious goal of maximizing utility. I address this mistake 
elsewhere (Natalie Gold, unpublished manuscript).
! There has been some presumption that team utility is the sum or average of the group 
utilities, the ʻutilitarianʼ payoff function. Bacharach (1999), in an illustrative example of his theory, 
took the group payoff to be the mean of the individual payoffs, as does Alessandra Smerilli (2008). 
Andrew Colman, Briony Pulford and Jo Rose (2007), in their test of team reasoning, followed 
Bacharachʼs later suggestion that team reasoners will aim for outcomes that Pareto dominate 
Nash equilibria, even when those outcomes are not equilibria themselves. Colman et al point out 
that, as consequence of this, the team reasoning outcomes in their experiment maximize the sum 
of the payoffs of the players.
! However, it should be obvious from the discussion above that team reasoning does not 
require that the team utility is the sum or average of the utility of the individual members and that 
some specific versions may reject this constraint.  
! As we saw, Bacharach hypothesized that the team utility function would be Paretian, i.e. if 
every individual agent gets at least as much utility in outcome x than outcome y, and at least one 
agent does strictly better, then the group function will rank outcome x above outcome y. The 
utilitarian payoff function is Paretian but so are many others. The Pareto criterion alone cannot 
resolve the question of how the team function ranks outcomes in situations of partial, but not 
complete, harmony of interest - for instance it does not give any guidance about how to rank the 
off-diagonal payoffs in the prisonerʼs dilemma. In contrast the utilitarian function can provide a 
ranking. However, the utilitarian function is more informationally demanding than the Pareto 
criterion. Applying the Pareto criterion only requires that utility is ordinally measurable and does not 
require interpersonal comparability, whereas the utilitarian function requires inter-personal 
comparability of utility. !
! Although Bacharach posited the Pareto criterion as an empirical hypothesis, he did not 
specify any conceptual constraints on the group goal. In contrast, Sugden would impose 
conceptual constraints on the team utility function which lead to the rejection of the idea that it is 
the average of the utility of the team members. Sugden assumes that, when a player identifies with 
a group, she wants to promote the combined interests of its two members, at least in so far as 
those interests are affected by the game that is being played. Since his theory is concerned with 
cooperation for mutual advantage, team members will not take on a team utility function that would 
make them worse off than they would be as individual agent (cf. the discussion in section 2 of the 
team payoff function in the prisonerʼs dilemma).  Since a team utility function that maximizes the 
sum of the individual payoffs takes no account of the distribution of payoffs between players, or of 
whether individual players improve their lot by team reasoning, the the team utility function in 
Sugdenʼs theory cannot simply be the sum of individual payoffs.
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! There is an obvious analogy between the notion of a team payoff in the theory of team 
reasoning and the idea of group fitness in evolutionary theories of group selection.14 The issue of 
the relation between individual and team payoff also has an interesting analogy with evolutionary 
biology. In evolutionary theory, most formal models define group fitness as total or average 
individual fitness. However, Rick Michod (2005) has argued that the fitness of the group cannot be 
equated with the total fitness of its parts. Michod allows that one situation can have more group 
fitness than another, even when the fitness of the individual units is exactly the same in each. 
Hence his model violates the Pareto criterion of social choice theory (Okasha, 2009) - the one 
criterion that it seems advocates of team reasoning agree on!
4. Framing and Team Reasoning
Bacharach and Sugdenʼs theories also differ in the way that group agency comes about. 
Gold and Sugden (2007; 2008) labelled Bacharachʼs theory ʻteam agency as the result of framingʼ, 
in contrast to Sugdenʼs emphasis on assurance. But that should not be taken to imply that framing 
has no role to play in Sugdenʼs theory. By comparing the how agents come to team reason in 
Bacharach and Sugdenʼs theories, I will unpick the various processes involved in framing in 
decision-making in general. 
Although Bacharachʼs theory is most strongly associated with framing, there is a framing step 
in Sugdenʼs theory as well. Sugden (2000) makes an analogy between the way that, in the theory 
of team reasoning, people have different preferences from the perspectives of different units of 
agency and the way that, in standard decision theory, preferences are relative to particular 
conceptions of, or framings of, decision problems. He also explains group identification in terms of 
framing:
ʻThe idea is that, in relation to a specific decision problem, an individual may conceive 
of herself as a member of a group or team, and conceive of the decision problem, not 
as a problem for her but as a problem for the team. In other words, the individual 
frames the problem, not as `What should I do?', but as `What should we do?'ʼ (2000, p.
182-3)
 
Sugden describes the framing of a decision-problem as reflecting the agentʼs subjective 
perceptions - what she takes her decision-problem to be - and her preferences as her all-things-
considered choice-relevant reasons. He says that her preferences are defined relative to her 
framing of the problem. So when Sugden says that an agent frames the problem as a problem for 
the team, that implies that the agent sees team considerations and achieving the group goal as 
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14 This was suggested to me by Samir Okasha, who himself draws an analogy between individual 
and group fitness, and individual and social preference orderings as investigated in social choice 
theory (Okasha, 2009).
choice-relevant. Hence Sugdenʼs account of team reasoning also involves framing, in the sense 
that it presupposes that the potential team reasoner conceptualizes the situation as a problem for 
the team, i.e. sees the team utility function as representing choice-relevant reasons. However, this 
is not enough to ensure that the agent will team reason. The agent also has to decide that she 
endorses team reasoning. 
Sugden likens endorsing mutually assured team reasoning to making a unilateral 
commitment to a certain form of practical reasoning, where this reasoning does not generate any 
implications for action unless one has assurance that others have made the same commitment. 
Such assurance could be created by public acts of commitment or induced by repeated experience 
of regularities of behaviour in a population. But the questions of assurance and endorsement are 
separate: even if each individual were assured that others would choose their components of the 
group payoff-maximizing profile, each would still have to decide whether team reasoning was a 
mode of reasoning that she wanted to endorse. It is possible for a person either to have assurance 
but not endorse team reasoning, or to endorse team reasoning but not to have assurance. 
! Assurance seems to be bound up with group identifying: ʻto construe oneself as a member 
of a team, one must have some confidence that the other members of that team construe 
themselves as members tooʼ (Sugden 2000, p.194). This suggests that an agent could see the 
relevance of team-directed reasons but, because she does not have assurance that other agents 
will team reason, she does not group identify, in the sense of conceiving the group as a unit of 
agency, acting as a single entity in pursuit of some single objective (Gold and Sugden 2007, 2008).
This contrasts with Bacharachʼs approach in Beyond Individual Choice, where he is 
interested in ʻthe role of spontaneous group identification in decision makingʼ (Bacharach 2006, p.
81), and there is no gap between framing the decision-problem as a problem for ʻusʼ and group 
identifying, or between group identifying and team reasoning, in which the agent can choose 
whether to group identify or to team reason.15 Bacharach does recognise that these are 
simplifications. When mooting the interpretation of ω as the probability that someone group 
identifies he footnotes an unexplored subtlety, that ʻThis assumes that group identification, if it 
happens, primes [team reasoning] with probability 1.  More generally, if this probability is p < 1, and 
that of group identification is v; then ω = pv.ʼ (2006, footnotes p.152). Never-the-less, reasoning 
about whether or not to team reason does not enter the picture. 
Nor does an agent who notices we-reasons get to decide whether or not she identifies with 
the group. When talking about group identification, Bacharach makes a distinction between the 
ʻsalienceʼ of features that tend to promote group identity and their ʻeffectivenessʼ, i.e. their 
tendencies, if and when perceived, to stimulate or inhibit group identity. However Bacharach 
speculates that there may be ʻa positive relationship between salience and effectivenessʼ; that if 
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15 Bacharach set out an earlier version of the theory in a 1997 working paper. Discussion of 
differences between the two will be confined to the footnotes.
features tending to promote group-identity are highly salient then, when noticed, they are also 
highly effective (Bacharach, 2006 p.87). So there is conceptual space in Bacharachʼs theory for a 
gap between noticing the group and group identifying. Elsewhere Bacharach says that this gap is 
filled by affiliation, ʻa psychological process in which a person who does think about a certain 
group, defined by some shared property, comes to think about it as ʻusʼʼ (Bacharach, 1997, p. 2). 
Thus the gap is filled by a psychological process, not a choice.
For both Bacharach and Sugden there are potential gaps between noticing the group and 
group identifying, and between group identifying and team reasoning. For Sugden these gaps are 
both bridged by decisions, for Bacharach they are filled by psychological processes. As explained 
below, for neither of them are these points subject to standards of practical, instrumental rationality.
Now we are in a position to delineate the various steps involved in framing and decision-
making. In the context of team reasoning: first the agent must see the possibility of cooperation 
and notice the potential for team reasoning, then she must group identify and see the group goal 
as providing a choice-relevant reason; third she must decide to act on team reasoning. The same 
steps occur in framing in general. We do not notice all the ways that we, counter-factually, could 
distinguish between objects or between actions. For a distinction to be the basis of action, an 
agent must first notice it. The move from ʻnoticingʼ simpliciter to ʻnoticing as choice-relevantʼ 
corresponds to Bacharachʼs ʻeffectivenessʼ. It also takes us to Sugdenʼs start-point, where an 
agent conceptualizes her decision-problem using considerations that she takes to be choice-
relevant. The move from ʻnoticing as choice-relevantʼ to deciding to act on team reasons 
corresponds to Sugdenʼs ʻendorsementʼ. We might call the two steps together, that take the agent 
from noticing a feature/ concept cluster/ family to acting on the reasons that it provides, 
ʻmotivational gripʼ. Then the two steps provide two reasons why a concept cluster, even when 
noticed, would not have motivational grip and hence would not be the basis for action: because it is 
not perceived as choice-relevant or because it is seen as choice-relevant but, nonetheless, does 
not form the basis of the agentʼs action. One reason an agent might not act on a feature that she 
acknowledges is choice-relevant is that she decides that it is not a reason that she wants to 
endorse. Other reasons why she might fail to move from seeing as choice-relevant to acting 
include making mistakes and akrasia (weakness of will).
These steps - noticing, noticing as choice relevant, and acting on - are involved in framing 
more generally, not just in the framing that leads to team reasoning.16 To illustrate this with an 
example, inspired by Sugdenʼs discussion of how economists model demand for consumption 
goods (Robert Sugden, 2000), consider someone in a supermarket deciding whether to buy an 
apple or an orange. It is natural to think of her as conceptualizing her decision-problem as 
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16 I rely here on an intuitive grasp of the notion of ʻnoticingʼ but I note that it is complicated and 
there are conceptual issues regarding noticing that I do not have space to go into here (e.g. we 
tend to notice things that are choice-relevant).
choosing whether to ʻbuy an appleʼ or ʻbuy an orangeʼ. In fact, she is probably confronted by a 
crate of apples and a crate of oranges, each containing numerous pieces of fruit. But, although we 
can distinguish many pieces of fruit according to their position, a normal person wouldnʼt see her 
choice as being between ʻbuy the apple on the top leftʼ, ʻbuy the apple, top left but oneʼ, .... ʻbuy the 
orange on the bottom right but oneʼ, ʻbuy the orange on the bottom rightʼ. The position of the 
pieces of fruit is not relevant to the decision problem and is not a part of its conceptualization. But 
position is a feature that someone might notice and discard as irrelevant to the choice.  
As Sugden points out, questions about how to frame decision-problems do not always have 
easy answers. Another way that we can distinguish fruit in supermarkets is by the identity of its 
supplier. Like position, the supplier does not usually enter models of purchasing decisions. 
However, in the 1980s whether the orange came from South Africa was, for many people, choice-
relevant information. Now-a-days some people choose, e.g., not to buy Israeli products, to buy 
products with fewer food miles, or to buy products that are fair trade. But other consumers are not 
bothered by the place of origin of their food. Supermarkets often label where food is from but many  
people do not assimilate this information, they do not ʻnoticeʼ it. In order for place of origin to 
influence purchasing decision, a shopper must first notice the origin, then take place of origin to be 
a choice-relevant feature and, finally, act on that feature. Further, people who are already 
committed to not buying from certain suppliers are more likely to notice and even seek out 
information about the place of origin of the goods in their shopping basket.  
Should consumers discriminate oranges according to their suppliers? For Sugden (2000, p.
200), ʻthere is no objective answer to this question, independent of consumers' subjective 
perceptions: what matters is whether consumers take them to be the same.ʼ This reflects Sugdenʼs 
general approach, which does not acknowledge agent-neutral concepts of ʻvalidityʼ and ʻrationalityʼ. 
I wonʼt comment upon his approach here. I will merely note that, in saying that there are no 
objective answers to questions about framing, Sugden places himself at odds with most of the 
literature on framing in individual decision-making which, at least implicitly - and sometimes 
explicitly - assumes that there is a correct way to frame a decision-problem. I also note that, 
despite many researchersʼ implicit commitments, there is at present no theory of rational framing 
that tells us whether a particular framing of a decision-problem is ʻcorrectʼ or not.17 
In Beyond Individual Choice Bacharach does not admit questions about the rationality of 
frames either. He is investigating valid instrumental practical reasoning. The agent can only reason 
from premises about the world that are accessible to her, so frames set the parameters of 
reasoning. Frames are supplied by involuntary psychological processes, to which the concept of 
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17 James Joyce (1999) makes some intriguing comments about how such a theory might proceed. 
John Broome (1991) has argued that we should individuate outcomes by justifiers, where a justifier 
is a difference between two putative outcomes that makes it rational to have a preference between 
them.  This implies that framing is a amenable to rational assessment, but Broome does not have 
any further discussion of what differences it is rational to have a preference between.
practical rationality does not apply. In other places, Bacharach suggested that a complete theory of 
rational choice would address questions about whether particular framings are rational or not 
(Bacharach, 2000) and discussed various problem cases (Bacharach, 1998). But any principles of 
rationality that are concerned with how agents should frame the world will not be principles of 
instrumental rationality. John Broomeʼs rational requirements of indifference (Broome, 1991), 
Susan Hurleyʼs agent neutral goals (Hurley, 1989) and Elizabeth Andersonʼs principles of rational 
self-identification (Anderson, 2001) all rely on thicker notions of rationality than means-end 
reasoning.
5. Team Reasoning vs Other Theories of Cooperation
Team reasoning has been advanced as a theory that can explain why cooperation is rational,  
as a theory that can predict cooperation, and as a psychological theory about how people make 
decisions. In this section I will compare team reasoning with other theories of cooperation on these 
dimensions. Again, the starting point for this is a comparison of the theoriesʼ analyses of 
cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma.
The prediction of rational cooperation
In the analysis above, a rational player of the one-shot Prisonerʼs Dilemma can choose 
cooperate.  For many game theorists, this conclusion is close to heresy.  For example, Ken 
Binmore (1994, pp. 102-117, quotation from p. 114) argues that it can be reached only by ʻa wrong 
analysis of the wrong gameʼ: if two players truly face the game shown in Figure 1, then it follows 
from the meaning of ʻpayoffʼ and from an unexceptionable concept of rationality that a rational 
player must choose defect. Binmore recognises that rational individuals may sometimes choose 
cooperate in games in which material payoffs – that is, outcomes described in terms of units of 
commodities which people normally prefer to have more of rather than less, such as money, or 
years of not being in prison – are as in Figure 1.  But that just shows that the payoffs that are 
relevant for game theory – the payoffs that govern behaviour – differ from the material ones.  The 
first stage in a game-theoretic analysis of a real-life situation should be to find a formal game that 
correctly represents that situation.
Thus in response to the problem of explaining why cooperate is sometimes chosen in games 
whose material payoffs have the Prisonerʼs Dilemma structure, the methodological strategy 
advocated by Binmore is that of payoff transformation: we should look for some way of 
transforming material payoffs into game-theoretic ones that makes observed behaviour consistent 
with conventional game-theoretic analysis.  This strategy has been followed by various theorists 
who have proposed transformations of material payoffs to take account of psychological or moral 
motivations that go beyond simple self-interest. For example, Ernst Fehr and Klaus Schmidt (1999) 
and Gary Bolton and Axel Ockenfels (2000) have proposed that, for any given level of material 
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payoff for any individual, that individual dislikes being either better off or worse off than other 
people.  Matthew Rabin (1993) proposes that each individual likes to benefit people who act with 
the intention of benefiting him, and likes to harm people who act with the intention of harming him. 
Cristina Bicchieri (2006) proposes a theory of norms such that, when an individual recognises that 
she is in a situation where a norm exists, she prefers to conform to the norm if she believes that a 
sufficiently large number of other people will also conform and that a sufficiently large number 
expect her to conform.
The theory of team reasoning can accept Binmoreʼs instrumental conception of rationality, 
but rejects his implicit assumption that agency is necessarily vested in individuals.  We can 
interpret the payoffs of a game as showing what each player wants to achieve if she takes herself 
to be an individual agent.  In this sense, the interpretation of the payoffs is similar to that used by 
Binmore: payoffs are defined, not in material terms, but in terms of what individuals are seeking to 
achieve.  The theory of team reasoning can replicate Binmoreʼs analysis when it is applied to 
players who take themselves to be individual agents: if Player 1 frames the game as a problem ʻfor 
meʼ, the only rational choice is defect.  However, the theory also allows the possibility that Player 1 
frames the game as a problem ʻfor usʼ.  In this case, the payoffs that are relevant in determining 
what it is rational for Player 1 to do are measures of what she wants to achieve as a member of the 
group {Player 1, Player 2}; and these need not be the same as the payoffs in the standard 
description of the game.
Thus, there is a sense in which team reasoning as an explanation of the choice of cooperate 
in the Prisonerʼs Dilemma depends on a transformation of payoffs from those shown in Figure 1.  
However, the kind of transformation used by theories of team reasoning is quite different from that 
used by theorists such as Fehr and Schmidt. In team reasoning, the transformation is not from 
material payoffs to choice-governing payoffs; it is from payoffs which govern choices for one unit of 
agency to payoffs which govern choices for another.  Thus, payoff transformation takes place as 
part of a more fundamental agency transformation. Once we accept the possibility of agency 
transformation, in a situation where there is common knowledge of group identification all that is 
needed to make a unique prediction of rational cooperation is the assumption that (cooperate, 
cooperate) is the best profile of actions for the two players together.  That assumption is hardly 
controversial in the games under consideration and in many everyday situations.18 
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18 There is also a sense in which team reasoning is more efficient than payoff transformation: it is 
more efficient at maximizing the team payoff function than a game between two benefactors,
(individuals who have each taken on the team payoff function but still use individual reasoning. 
Bacharach (1999) proves that optimal team decision rules give Nash equilibra for benefactors but 
not all Nash equilibria for benefactors define optimal team decision rules. Intuitively, team 
reasoners are concerned with co-ordination, and co-ordination is important for efficiency - there is 
usually a lesser total payoff when agents fail to co-ordinate in games with scope. The team 
reasoning equilibrium singles out the best of the possible ways of co-ordinating, whereas 
benefaction generally does not lead to a unique equilibrium, leaving the possibility of mis-co-
ordination.
Then, the idea is that the rationality of each individualʼs action derives from the rationality of 
the joint action of the team. Bacharach says,
ʻThe remainder of the team reasoning procedure is then inevitable. Once I have 
computed the best team profile and identified my  component in it, team reasoning 
prescribes that I should choose to perform this component... I am rationally  obliged 
to follow the remainder of the procedure. If I believe that we should do a certain 
combination of actions, it is logically required that I also believe that I should do the 
bit that falls to me. If I am convinced that we should pass each other on the left, I 
must also think that I should pass you on the left (and that you should do likewise). 
The underlying general principle is that I cannot coherently  will something without 
willing what I know to be logically  entailed by  it. This is a standard inference rule of 
deontic logic, the logic of what ought to be.ʼ (2006, chapter 4, section 4)19
Not everyone agrees with Bacharach about the rules of deontic logic. But even those who 
disagree that it follows from the rationality of a profile for the group that it is rational for the 
individual members to play their part, must acknowledge that team reasoning is no worse off than 
standard decision theory in this respect. Actions are taken by temporal parts of people and, as is 
notorious in the theory of dynamic choice, the incentives of a temporal part may differ from the 
interests of her later selves or from the interests of the agent conceived as a person over time. Any  
difficulty that the theory of team reasoning has when explaining why it is rational for individuals to 
play their part in the team plan is analogous to the difficulty that standard decision theory has to 
overcome, if it is to explain why it is rational for temporal parts to act in the interests of the person 
over time.20
In contrast, even if payoffs have been transformed to go beyond self interest, conventional 
game theory still does not necessarily provide an explanation of why each individual chooses 
cooperate in a prisonerʼs dilemma.  The payoff transformation theories listed above all tend to 
function by decreasing the relative appeal of the ʻoff-diagonal outcomesʼ where one player 
cooperates and the other doesnʼt. Depending on the theory, the individual does not want: to get a 
different payoff from the other player; to cooperate and hence benefit another player who is 
defecting and hence harming himself, and vice versa; or to follow a norm when no-one else does. 
This can make (cooperate, cooperate) into a Nash Equilibrium. But it does not tend to alter the 
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19 Anderson also argues that, when a group of agents see their actions as jointly advancing a 
common goal, then it is rational for an agent ʻto do my part in what we are willing 
togetherʼ (Anderson 2000, pp. 28–30).
20 For more on the analogy between individuals and teams, and time slices and persons-over-time, 
see Gold (forthcoming). 
equilibrium status of (defect, defect).21 There are now two Nash Equilibria, (cooperate, cooperate) 
and (defect, defect). So payoff transformation theories face the problem of equilibrium selection, 
explained above. They cannot show that that rational players of this game choose cooperate or 
make a unique prediction of cooperation. The situation of payoff transformation theories is similar 
regarding cooperation in the stag hunt, except that (stag, stag) was already an equilibrium anyway 
before any payoff transformation occurred.22  
The problem faced by theories of individual reasoning in explaining cooperation is that 
recommendations for action are conditional on the actor's beliefs about what the other individuals 
will do.  Within classical theory, there are no grounds for assigning such beliefs. However payoff 
transformation theories can also predict cooperation if the prior probability that each player assigns 
to the other cooperating is suitably high or, for Bicchieri, if the probability that the other player is 
sensitive to the norm is suitably high. So, in order to make the prediction, they must be 
supplemented with an account of the probabilities that the agent assigns. The agents of classical 
game theory have no grounds for assigning probabilities one way or the other so, if the proponents  
of payoff transformation theories wish to claim that they predict rational cooperation, then they also 
owe us an account of how rational agents acquire their probability estimates. It is usually claimed 
that rational probabilities are formed by Bayesian updating, and Bicchieri explicitly appeals to the 
idea that the probability that the other player will be norm-sensitive is high in a Bayesian game.23 In 
contrast, the theory of team reasoning generates recommendations for action that are not 
conditional on the actor's beliefs about what the other individuals will do. Where there is common 
knowledge of group identification, the theory of team reasoning can predict rational cooperation. 
Recommendations are conditional on beliefs about group identification, but these are outside the 
purview of instrumental rationality. Whilst payoff transformation theories of cooperation can predict 
cooperation given suitable beliefs, there is a sense on which only team reasoning predicts rational 
cooperation, within the restrictions of classical game theory.
The explanation of cooperation
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21 For a more detailed exposition of team reasoning versus payoff transformation theories of 
cooperation in the prisonerʼs dilemma, including a numerical example, see section 3 of Gold and 
Sugden (2008).
22 It is possible that, in the stag hunt, a player who was suckered when playing stag would not 
consider that the rabbit player intended to harm her. However,even if Rabinʼs theory does not 
downgrade the off-diagonal outcomes in this case, it is not going to show that (stag, stag) is 
uniquely rational because the theory does not change the equilibrium status of (rabbit, rabbit).
23 Whilst considering Bayes and rationality, we might also note that framing is problematic for 
Bayesianism. For the operation of Bayes rule, we must assume that the agent assigns a strictly 
positive probability to each alternative. There is no space for a agent to be simply unaware of an 
alternative.
! Team reasoning is proposed by both Bacharach and Sugden as a mode of reasoning that 
people actually use. Advocates of payoff transformation theories also claim that their favoured 
payoff transformation describes what people do. All these theories can, in principle, explain 
cooperation. But which provides the best explanation of what people do? One way to adjudicate 
the question is to compare the theories with respect to evidence about their auxiliary hypotheses.24
! One type of auxiliary hypothesis relates to evolution. Any proposed proximate mechanism 
for cooperation must be a possible result of evolution, so having a plausible evolutionary story 
speaks in favour of any particular proximate mechanism. (Conversely, if we have independent 
reasons for favouring a particular proximate mechanism and if that mechanism has implications for 
the correct ultimate mechanism, then we might be able to use what we know about the proximate 
mechanism to adjudicate between ultimate, evolutionary explanations.) There is not space here to 
go into detail about the relation between proximate and ultimate explanations, but I will compare 
Bacharach and Sugdenʼs views about the evolution of the capacity for team reasoning. 
! Bacharach (2006, ch.3) argued that group selection can explain cooperative behaviour and 
that group identification is a key proximate mechanism in producing well functioning groups. 
Sugden, on the other hand, thinks that group selection is unlikely to be part of any ultimate 
explanation because the conditions that are required for group selection to occur were never 
fulfilled (personal communication). 
 Sugden (2002; 2005) has suggested that team reasoning is related to generalised 
reciprocity, which is at least partly sustained by agents taking pleasure in the correspondence of 
their sentiments with the sentiments of others in the group, or fellow-feeling. A natural corollary 
would be to hypothesise that reciprocity is the appropriate ultimate explanation. Alternatively, 
Sugden’s account of fellow-feeling might be compatible with kin selection. We might have evolved 
fellow-feeling because it was helpful for increasing the number of descendants left by our kin - who 
in Pleistocene times would also have been our fellow group (or deme) members. But, in modern 
times, the trait ‘mis-fires’ and we apply it to group members who are not related to us. 
 Alternatively, given the right environmental conditions, team reasoning might have evolved 
by individual selection. Although he mainly focussed on group selection, Bacharach himself raises 
this intriguing possibility. He claims that our ancestors faced ludic diversity, or an environment in 
which they had to play many types of games. Team reasoning gets good results in a variety of 
games and, since we have limited cognitive resources, team reasoners might have had an 
evolutionary advantage because team reasoning is a parsimonious way of achieving good 
20
24 Another way is to run experiments to test the theories. However, since all the theories claim to 
explain cooperation, when trying to discriminate between them, looking at behaviour in standard 
games is not sufficient. Some effort has been put into identifying which reasoning or payoff 
transformations people actually use and some ingenious experiments have been devised. Colman 
et al (2007) test team reasoning by constructing games in which there are unique Nash Equilibria 
that would not maximize a team payoff function. Guala et al (2009) compare team reasoning with 
other theories of cooperation by considering the role of expectations in various theories and 
manipulating subjectsʼ beliefs.
outcomes across a diverse range of situations. In this story, team reasoning emerges by individual 
selection.
 Hence it should be obvious that it is neither the case that group selection being wrong 
would be problematic for Bacharach’s theory, nor that group selection being right would be 
problematic for Sugden. When Bacharach proposed that team reasoning evolved by group 
selection, he argued that a ‘how possible’ evolutionary explanation provided evidential support for 
the existence of team reasoning. The fact that there are multiple ‘how possible’ explanations 
available that support the evolution of team reasoning is not damaging to the theory. Although 
Bacharach and Sugden may prefer different ‘how possible’ explanations, it is not clear that either of 
their theories requires their preferred evolutionary explanation. In particular, whether or not team 
reasoning is a mechanism that people use is independent of whether or not there was group 
selection.
! A second type of auxiliary hypothesis is about the psychological capacities that each theory 
requires. For example, sympathy is required for altruism, intention detecting for Rabinʼs kindness, 
a sense of obligation or desire for conformity for norms, group identification or fellow feeling for 
team reasoning. Evidence for all of these capacities can be found. This supports the intuitively 
appealing view that humans are creatures with heterogenous motivations, so in practice a catholic 
approach is to be favoured. Gold and Sugden (2007) explicitly say that a given pattern of 
behaviour could be generated either collectively, using team reasoning, or individually, using 
individual reasoning supplemented with appropriate beliefs.25
! However, if we want to encourage cooperation then we need more precise answers, as 
different theories indicate different strategies for increasing cooperation: should we institute 
policies that affect expectations, increase group identification, or enable transparent perception of 
peopleʼs intentions? Even accepting that all the above motivations are used in some 
circumstances, a complete theory would specify which motivation is used in which circumstances. 
! Another type of auxiliary hypothesis that any of these theories could be supplemented with 
is a hypothesis about framing. In any particular situation that offers the potential for cooperation, it 
might be possible to construe the situation in several ways, so that more than one of altruism, 
inequality aversion, kindness, norms, team reasoning, etc. could be seen as choice relevant. As 
discussed above, a pre-requisite for modeling a situation is deciding which considerations are 
choice-relevant for the agent. Those theories that do not explicitly include framing assume it 
implicitly. If we accept that humans have heterogeneous motivations, then we need to know under 
what circumstances people frame the situation so that each potential motivation is seen as be 
21
25 Another type of auxiliary hypothesis involves support for the cognitive primitives implied by a 
theory. With respect to team reasoning, Gold and Harbour (forthcoming) argue that the primitives 
needed for team reasoning enjoy direct and diverse support from linguistic theory. They use this 
approach to discriminate between theories of collective intentions but, at present, this approach 
has not been used to discriminate between theories of cooperation.
choice-relevant. A general theory of framing might give us a theoretical grip on when each theory 
can predict choice, and provide testable hypotheses. 
!
6. Conclusion
I have explained why games with scope pose both a normative and an explanatory problem 
for classical game theory, and I have shown how team reasoning can explain cooperation in 
prisonerʼs dilemmas and stag hunts. By comparing Bacharach and Sugdenʼs theories of team 
reasoning, I have shown some of the ways in which theories of team reasoning can differ. 
I clarified that neither Bacharach nor Sugden is committed to the idea that the team payoff 
function is the average of the individual utilities and that Sugden is not committed to expected 
utility maximization. In doing so, I drew a structural analogy between models of team reasoning 
and models of group selection, although I demonstrated that the truth of the theory of team 
reasoning does not rely on the truth of the theory of group selection.
I also showed how framing has a role to play in both Bacharach and Sugdenʼs theories and, 
indeed, in all theories of cooperative motivations. A complete theory of cooperative behaviour 
would require an account of when people ʻnoticeʼ particular features of situations, when people 
take features as ʻchoice relevantʼ and when noticing a feature as choice relevant leads to choosing 
in accordance with it. 
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